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Carers, Families, Relatives: 
Socio-legal Conceptions of Care- 
giving Relationships 
by Julia Twigg 
Senior Lecturer, University of Hull 
Abstract: In I990 for the first time the term “carer” was employed in 
legislation in the NHS and Community Care Act. The word had emerged in 
academic literature in the I970s, spreading to professional discourse in the 
1980s; and it marks a change in emphasis from earlier usage in terms of 
families, relatives and next of kin. The law had previously touched on the areas 
of care-giving and family relations but within different frames of reference. 
This paper explores four of these: the “liable relatives” tradition of the Poor 
Law; the inheritance laws; medical decision-making by next of kin; and the 
role of the “nearest relative” in mental health legislation. It then discusses the 
significance of the emergence of the new terminology and the welfare debates 
within which it is embedded. 
Introduction 
In 1990 for the first time the word “carer” was employed in statute when the 
NHS and Community Care Act 1990 laid an obligation on local authorities to 
consult not only District Health Authorities, Family Health Service Author- 
ities, and agencies in the voluntary sector but also 
“the interests of private carers who within that area provide care to persons for 
whom in the exercise of their social services functions, the local authority have a 
power or a duty to provide services.” 
The Act defines “private carer” as “a person who is not employed to 
provide the care in question,” but takes the definition no further (NHS and 
Community Care Act 1990, section 46). In the extensive government 
guidance issued in the wake of the Act carers feature more prominently, and 
the phrase “users and carers” is employed repeatedly, though without 
explication of the term. 
The use of the word marks a new departure in the law’s conceptualisation 
of family relationships and responsibilities. In the second half of this paper I 
will discuss the implications of the new term: its meaning and the welfare 
debates within which it is embedded. Before doing so I will explore some of 
the other ways in which the law has attempted to define or codify family or 
care-giving relations, exploring four areas: the “liable relatives” tradition of 
the Poor Law; the inheritance laws; medical decision-making by next of kin; 
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and the role of the “nearest relative” in mental health legislation. Each of 
these touches on aspects of care and caring, though in ways that are 
significantly different from a conceptualisation in terms of a “carer.” The 
difference between the terms and the significance of the shift in terminology 
will be explored in the second part of the paper. 
“Liable relatives” under the Poor Law 
There is no general obligation under English law for individuals to support 
their relatives, with the exception of the obligations of parents for their 
under-age children and of spouses. Established texts on family law such as 
Hoggett and Pearl (1991) or Eekelaar (1984) touch on the subject only 
briefly: from the current legal point of view the subject of wider family 
relations has no status and there is no body of law to discuss. This is in 
contrast to other European legal traditions, such as that of Germany where 
the obligation to support relatives has been formally codified. In Germany 
adult children are required to provide financial support to their parents and 
can be charged by the public authorities for the cost of both their financial 
upkeep and care. Similar principles apply in Italy and France (Rheinstein, 
1960). 
The only area of English law where offspring have been in a comparable 
position was under the Poor Law which encoded a responsibility for relatives 
to support their kin in certain circumstances, and provided a means whereby 
the costs of the public support of individuals could be recouped from their 
relatives. The Poor Law was formally abolished in 1948. At  that point it was 
not replaced by any other legal definition of family obligation, and English 
welfare legislation currently imposes no duty on individuals to support their 
relatives (Finch, 1989). 
The shift from an encoded obligation under the Poor Law to none has 
often been interpreted as supporting the view that “in the past” older and 
disabled people were cared for by their relatives, and that this was the 
accepted norm, enforced by the public authorities. The shift to “modern” 
(or in different versions “industrial” or “capitalist”) society and the associ- 
ated “rise of the welfare state” is seen as effecting a fundamental shift in 
responsibilities whereby the support of older and disabled people moves 
away from the sphere of the family and into that of the state. This unilinear 
and Whiggish account of the transfer of responsibility has been subject to 
criticism in terms of its analysis both of the present and of the past. Research 
undertaken in the 1980s clearly established the primary role still played by 
the family in the support of disabled and older people (Finch and Groves, 
1983; Green, 1988; Arber, et al., 1988). It is not the case that families no 
longer care for their kin, as has sometimes been asserted by politicians and 
public moralists (Qureshi and Walker, 1989). 
The traditional account has been subject to challenge and emendation 
from the historical point of view also (Thomson, 1986, 1991; Smith, 1984. 
Current scholarship emphasises the limited obligations impwed in the past 
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by the law in England and the relative lack of assumption that the support of 
older and disabled people should rightly fall on their kin. Thomson argues 
that the obligations imposed by the Poor Law were not as great as might 
appear, and that we need to understand the English tradition as always being 
one in which the assumption of support by family was only weakly held. 
From the early modern period onwards, he argues, there was a clear 
acceptance that the support of indigent older people was something that 
could be expected to fall on the parish or the collectivity. He points in 
support of this to the limited range of family obligations imposed by the Poor 
Law. In relation to older people it extended only to adult children, not to 
siblings, nieces or nephews, or grandchildren. It did not extend to relations- 
in-law; and a woman’s responsibility for her parents ended at marriage. 
Grandchildren brought up by grandparents were not obliged to support 
them. The obligation related only to financial support; and there was no 
attempt to force relatives to provide other forms of care or to take the elderly 
person into their homes. The rules applied only where the person was 
destitute; there was no obligation to give money where the relative was 
merely poor or where there was a great disparity between the material 
circumstances of children and their parents. Lastly the obligation to main- 
tain was subject to having sufficient means, and in assessing this the officers 
of the Poor Law took into account what was recognised as prior respon- 
sibilities to support wives and children. Prosecutions in relation to the 
support of older people were rare, and pursued by the authorities only with 
reluctance. Thomson concludes that magistrates did not really expect the 
children of the poor to support their parents. The real thrust of the Poor Law 
was always against neglectful husbands and fathers, and it was broadly 
accepted that destitute older people would primarily be supported by the 
collectivity. 
A shift occurred in the policy debate in the late nineteenth century when 
attempts were made under pressure from what Smith terms “demograph- 
ically induced difficulties” to “cajole children under legal threat to care for or 
contribute to the cost of care for their parents” (Smith, 1984, p. 423), but 
these were unsuccessful and unpopular and ushered in a reaction. The 
Pensions Act 1908 endowed older people with a degree of financial indepen- 
dence that obviated much of the need to call on relatives for support, and he 
suggests that this new independence produced better and closer relations 
between the generations rather than marking a decline in association. The 
early twentieth-century reformers who created the welfare state formed 
their perception of the past in relation to this policy debate and to the 
relatively harsh regime of the late nineteenth century; and the contrast 
between this and their aspirations was an important source of the image of 
the past as an age of unquestioned and publicly enforced family obligation 
(Thomson, 1986). 
Thomson argues that if we think of welfare provision as existing between 
two poles, that of collective responsibility and that of individual (or familial) 
responsibility, older people have for the last two centuries at least been 
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predominantly placed near the collective pole. He, together with Smith 
(1984), roots this assumption of collective responsibility in the particular 
demographic regime characteristic of North-West Europe. This is marked 
by low fertility, late marriage, individual freedom of choice in marriage and 
relatively low mortality. I t  is a regime of high mobility, with children leaving 
the parental home before marriage to enter another household, and of weak 
links between kin. Marriage, which typically occurs late and depends on 
access to resources. results in the formation of a new household. Households 
rarely extend beyond the nuclear family. This pattern which has been 
characteristic of North-West Europe at least from the late middle ages 
contrasts with that of, for example, South-East Asia or southern European 
regimes in the  past where marriage has been early, and fertility and 
mortality high, and where the extended family imposes multiple kinship 
obligations. Thomson, in line with Laslett (1972, 1977) and Smith (1984), 
argues that the North-West demographic regime imposes considerable risk 
on individuals. Weak family ties, high mobility, small numbers of offspring 
and high levels of non-marriage together produce circumstances where 
many individuals will not be able to call on support from kin. So that 
although, it is argued, it is a regime that favours the accumulation of savings, 
their investment in enterprise and thus the crucial break into self-sufficient 
growth that is the basis of the emergence of capitalism, it is a regime that 
imposes high risk on individuals. It needs a corresponding commitment by 
the collectivity to underwrite the security of individuals. The early accept- 
ance of public responsibility for indigent older people in England can 
therefore be seen in terms of the particular dynamics of its demographic 
regime, and the liable relatives tradition of the Poor Law placed in that 
context . 
Inheritance laws 
The Poor Law was designed for the  regulation of a particular class of 
people-the poor-and its codification of family obligation was limited to 
that group. By contrast, the main preoccupation of the law in relation to the 
family, as Crowther comments, has always been elsewhere, concerned with 
issues of inheritance (Crowther, 1982). Here the dominant English tradition 
is not one of obligation but of testamentary freedom. 
Testamentary freedom emerged out of earlier medieval restriction during 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The process reached its apogee in 
1891, and between then and 1938, testamentary freedom was absolute in 
England (Oughton and Tyler, 1984). Individuals were free to leave their 
property as they wished and with no regard to any obligations that they might 
have to their families. This is in contrast to many Continental traditions, 
particularly those based on the Napoleonic Code in which certain classes of 
heirs are given entrenched rights and limits are placed on the proportion of 
the estate that can be left away from the family. In France, for example, the 
proportion of the estate with which the testator can deal freely (quotit4 
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disponibfe) is a third if he/she has two children and a quarter if he/she has 
three or more. Similar rules apply in Italy (Dyson, 1987; Hudson and 
Barbalich, 1991). 
English law was modified in 1938 after pressure during the 1920s and 1930s 
from feminists and others concerned with the fate of wives and children left 
dispossessed. The Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938 introduced 
judicial discretion rather than entrenched rights, and under it the courts 
were given the power to make reasonable provision for dependent family 
members notwithstanding the inheritance laws and the principle of freedom 
of testation. Spouses, under-age sons, unmarried daughters and adult sons 
and daughters who had mental or physical disabilities could apply for 
provision. Further adjustments were made in 1966 and 1975 which extended 
legitimate applicants to include anyone dependent on the deceased. Fixed 
shares were discussed in the 1970s but rejected by the Law Commission 
Report (Oughton and Tyler, 1984). 
In none of these formulations are caring and inheritance linked in any 
legally defined way. The debates that took place in the run-up to the reforms 
of 1938 and 1975 were concerned not with intergenerational reciprocity in 
the sense of caring, but with issues of vulnerability and just deserts in 
relation to wives and children. There had been an earlier tradition that had 
linked the  two in “care contracts” whereby property, usually a farm, was 
passed to the next generation in return for an explicit undertaking to 
maintain the older person. Such contracts, however, need to be understood 
in the context of farms as economic units. As Sorensen concludes: “retire- 
ment contracts created in former times should be seen as mechanisms for 
securing the match between certain families and a property rather than as 
the manner for providing care for the old” (Sorensen, 1989, p. 211). 
During the 1980s however, caring and inheritance were increasingly 
linked within policy debates concerning the support of older people. The 
spread of home ownership held out the promise of a society where an 
increased proportion of the population would inherit substantial sums; and 
this occurred in conjunction with a growing perception of housing as a 
capital asset rather than simply a place to live. Older people were encour- 
aged to see the release of housing equity as a means of funding care 
(Oldman, 1991). These shifts in perception concerning housing occurred in 
the context of increasing anxieties as to the public costs of supporting older 
people and a new right-wing emphasis on individual market solutions. As a 
result a muted debate emerged in government and policy circles as to 
whether the costs of caring--emotional and financial-might not be dis- 
counted against future inheritance and the problems posed to government 
by an increasingly articulate carer lobby circumvented in this way. After all, 
if families were going to inherit the house, perhaps their current activities 
were not so unreasonably burdensome. 
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The involvement of next of kin in decision-making 
It has been common practice in hospitals where the patient is not mentally 
competent-typically older mentally infirm people-for relatives to be 
asked to sign giving their consent to major interventions such as surgery. 
Such requests are related more to a concern to  pre-empt a basis for complaint 
and to gain the agreement of relatives than to legal reality, for relatives or 
next of kin, as we shall see, are not able in law to give such consent. The 
process, however, is presented as a legal action and relatives are asked to sign 
in their capacity as “next of kin,” which is how hospitals have traditionally 
recorded family relationships. The term has a quasi-legal ring to it and some 
of its roots relate to the dutiesof the next of kin concerning the registration of 
death and the arrangements for the disposal of the body. More recently there 
has been a shift in some hospitals towards employing the term “carer,” 
usually as part of a more systematic approach to discharge planning where 
the importance of the carer is recognised. As we shall see, the principal carer 
is frequently the next of kin,  though not always, and the two terms have 
slightly different emphases. 
Despite the established practice of consultation, relatives in fact have no 
legal status in medical decision-making and this extends to spouses. Al- 
though it is customary, for example, to gain a spouse’s signature on a request 
for sterilisation, i t  is not necessary; and women are similarly free to obtain 
abortions regardless of the wishes of their husbands (Gunn, 1987; Kennedy, 
1988). The fact that these decisions could be said to affect the spouses closely 
does not translate into any right in law to be consulted. This point is 
important in the context of our understanding of the term “carer,” for some 
at least of the basis for the incorporation of carers into public policy arises 
from the fact that caring has consequences for their lives and can as a result 
be said to endow them with a legitimate interest in decision-making. We 
shall return to this point below. 
Where the patient is under age, particularly under the age of 16 (see 
Family Law Reform Act 1969, section 8), parents do have a capacity to take 
decisions, including those relating to medical interventions. The extent and 
basis of their power, however, have been open to dispute, as was illustrated in 
the Gillick case (Kennedy, 1988). The circumstances of the Gillick case 
presume an eventual end to parental authority and an assumption of capacity 
by the child. Where the child has learning disability, however, the situation is 
more problematic. The gradual assumption of capacity cannot be assumed 
and, as we shall see, there is no source of valid legal consent to treatment in 
the case of adults who are mentally incapable, though during their childhood 
parents are legally capable of taking such decisions as part of a general 
capacity of parents to do so. This has given rise to the situation where parents 
have been able to authorise interventions such as abortions and sterilisations 
while a young woman is under age, but not thereafter. In the past many such 
operations took place, and not only on those who were under age, and it is 
only recently that the capacity of parents to act in this way has been 
challenged. 
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The third area where the role of parents in decision-making has been 
subject to challenge concerns the fate of babies born with severe disabilities. 
The area is an increasingly contentious one in which doctors have tradi- 
tionally exercised discretion (Kennedy, 1981). In doing so it has been 
customary for them to assess the wishes or views of parents, partly to weigh 
up the likely future of the child, and partly from an idea that parents have a 
right to a say in the care of their baby. From the legal point of view, neither of 
these bases is entirely satisfactory. In the recent case of Re B ,  the Court of 
Appeal overturned the view of the judge of first instance who had concurred 
with the decision not to treat the baby, arguing that the judge had put too 
great an emphasis on the wishes of the parents (Kennedy, 1988). Kennedy 
supports such a view, asserting that it had never been part of morality or law 
that parents should have discretion as to whether a child lives or dies. 
The situation in regard to adults is different. As we have seen, relatives 
ordinarily have no rights to be consulted in medical decision-making. Issues 
arise, however, where the patient is mentally incapable; for example, by 
reason of severe mental illness, learning disability, or organic brain damage 
through senile dementia or a stroke. Often in such cases the individual is 
cared for by a relative, who perforce has to make decisions for them on a day- 
to-day basis. The legal basis for such decision-making is, however, far from 
certain. Without valid consent, medical interventions constitute an assault. 
Where an adult is mentally incapable of giving consent, there is no clear 
alternative source. The doctrine of necessity covers emergency interven- 
tions by a doctor, but not those like routine dental treatment or cervical 
smears that are merely advisory (Gunn, 1987; Law Commission, 1991). The 
consent of a relative “is of no effect since there is no power vested in a relative 
to consent to the treatment of another” (Kennedy, 1988, p. 340). Machinery 
does exist whereby decisions can be made in regard to property, but this does 
not extend to decisions concerning the person. Thus the remit of the Court of 
Protection, deriving from the prerogative powers of the Crown in regard to 
feudal estates, does not extend to medical decisions. Enduring Power of 
Attorney, developed in the 1980s to allow for the continuing management of 
the affairs of someone who is no longer mentally capable, again cannot 
extend to medical or personal care decisions, and can only be activated 
where the person was formerly mentally capable. It cannot cover the 
circumstances of adults with learning disabilities, nor those who have not 
made provision in advance. 
The area has recently been subject to debate and review in reports by the 
Law Commission and the Law Society (Law Society, 1989; Law Commis- 
sion, 1991) and various solutions to the impasse are presented in the Law 
Commission report. Most are institutionally based; for example, extending 
the powers of the Court of Protection to cover medical and personal 
decisions. One, however, rests on establishing a mechanism akin to the intes- 
tacy laws whereby prescribed relatives would be endowed with the capacity 
to make decisions on behalf of a mentally incapable relative. The reasons 
given for involving relatives in this way are threefold. Throughout the report 
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and i n  the wider debate concerning mental incapacity, preference is given to 
decision-making based on “substitute judgement” rather than generalised 
“best interests”: and relatives are clearly the most important source of such 
information as to the putative preferences of the individual. Relatives are 
also assumed to have the well-being of the patient at heart, though the report 
recognises that they can act in bad faith. Lastly relatives are already involved: 
in practice they are the ones making many decisions. Reforms that give them 
a recognised status would enable this reality of responsibility to be placed on 
a more satisfactory legal basis. The report proposes as a basis a combination 
of care-giving responsibility and kinship relation, and points to the mental 
health legislation where, as we shall see, the law has gone some of the way 
towards defining such a hierarchy of responsibility among kin. 
The “nearest relative” in mental health legislation 
Mental health is the one field of social care where relatives have been 
endowed with formal powers defined in statute. The Mental Health Act 1983 
recognises and gives powers to the “nearest relative” of the patient. These 
powers centre on the right to make application for compulsory admission of 
the patient (temporary or long-term) and the right to seek their release. The 
powers are only those of initiation and request; admission must be supported 
by two doctors and discharge subject to the approval of the Responsible 
Medical Officer. The capacity of the “nearest relative” to seek an admission 
is shared by the Approved Social Worker whose powers parallel those of the 
relative. Nearest relatives also have a right to be informed where the 
Approved Social Worker is seeking a compulsory admission. Where relat- 
ives object to a long-term admission for treatment, their objections can be 
overturned only by appeal to the County Court. Detailed accounts of the 
powers of the nearest relative are found in  Hoggett and Beech (Hoggett, 
1984; Beech, 1986). 
The 1983 Act, section 26, defines closely who is to be identified as the 
“nearest relative”; establishing a hierarchy that starts with the spouse 
(unless permanently separated) and recognises co-habitees of six months’ 
standing. Sons and daughters follow, regardless of sex, but giving preference 
to the one who is most involved in caring. The latter provision was added in 
the 1983 Act, and represents a slight shift away from a status-oriented, 
ascriptive definition towards one that reflects the particular patterns of care- 
giving. Parents follow; succeeded by siblings, grandparents, grandchildren, 
uncles and aunts, nieces and nephews, with priority given to the eldest and to 
whole blood over half blood. Finally the Act recognised the potential role of 
non-related care-givers, though the patient has to have been living with them 
for five years or more, and they can only be so recognised where no relative 
exists. Professionals have no discretion as to who is to be identified as the 
nearest relative, but someone so designated can authorise another to act. 
The formal status accorded to relatives in mental health legislation is, as 
we have seen, unusual-at odds with their position elsewhere in the legal 
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system, where their statutory rights are minimal, even non-existent, though 
the social reality of their involvement may be quite widely recognised. The 
situation has to be seen in the context of the longer history of mental health 
legislation, which is in turn rooted in an older discourse of madness and the 
family. 
During the eighteenth century any relative or indeed friend who was 
willing to foot the bill could have someone committed to a private madhouse 
under the general common law ability to restrain a dangerous lunatic 
(Hoggett, 1984). During the early nineteenth century there was growing 
concern at the ability of relatives to have their kin put away in this fashion, 
and safeguards were instituted requiring that a doctor should support the 
application. The involvement of relatives was confined to those cases where 
the family took financial responsibility, and applied therefore only to the 
better-off. Pauper lunatics were brought before the justices who could direct 
that they be admitted to the County Asylum, and their families took no part 
in the matter. 
The Lunacy Act 1890 brought these two streams together. After the 
optimism of the early nineteenth century, associated with the reforming 
moral management of madness, therapeutic pessimism set in. Asylums were 
increasingly seen as custodial institutions that required to be legally regu- 
lated. Much of the thrust of the 1890 Act was concerned to ensure that the 
sane did not unwittingly fall under regimes for the mad (Unsworth, 1987). 
The 1890 Act represented a shift from an earlier position where doctors were 
seen as important figures safeguarding patients against improper confine- 
ment by their relatives to one where relatives were seen as protection against 
unscrupulous asylum doctors. The 1890 Act laid down that the petition to 
have a person detained should wherever possible be presented by the 
husband, wife, or relative. If it were not, it should explain why not and state 
the connection between the lunatic and the petitioner. The petition, accom- 
panied by a statement from two doctors, would then be presented to the 
magistrate. The petitioner was obliged to visit every six months or send a 
representative (Lunacy Act 1890). 
The twentieth century saw a new, more medical emphasis on the treat- 
ment of the mad. Therapeutic optimism revived. The specialism of psychia- 
try developed and increasingly located itself within the same medical 
paradigm as physical illness (Unsworth, 1987). By the 1950s greater trust in 
the efficacy and goodwill of psychiatrists led to a desire to move away from 
the “legalism” of the 1890 Act that reformers regarded as inseparable from a 
punitive, scientifically uninformed view of mental disorder. The Mental 
Health Act 1959 ended judicial involvement in compulsory admissions in the 
form of a magistrate, replacing it by the decision of two doctors. Whereas 
under the 1890 Act medical judgement was not conclusive and was subject to 
lay authority, the 1959 Act abolished this and transferred the decision about 
confinement into the medical sphere. At the same time, however, the ability 
of relatives to seek compulsory admission and to apply for release was 
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retained, transferred into the new statute broadly in the form that is current 
today. 
At this time there was no systematic discussion as to why and whether 
relatives should remain involved in this way (Hoggett, 1984). The question of 
their privileged position was debated, however, in the run-up to the Mental 
Health (Amendment) Act 1982. This represented a swing back towards a 
more legally based approach, one emphasising the civil rights of the patient. 
Gostin among others argued that the actions of relatives were not always 
benign, and that they could be “an integral part of the patient’s mental 
disorder” (Gostin, quoted in  Hoggett. 1984). 
The changes embodied in the 1983 Act represent as much the assertion of 
the new profession of social work as they do the control of doctors by civil 
rights principles. I t  was argued by those promoting the new professional 
perspective that i t  was inappropriate for relatives and social workers to have 
parallel powers. Social workers in making an application could provide a 
professionally-based social report on the case, whereas relatives could only 
speak from a personal perspective. The DHSS review of the proposed 
reforms noted these criticisms, but concluded that their powers should be 
retained. The report commented that some relatives “may prefer to feel that 
they are in control of the situation, and they will be in the best position to 
judge when they are unable to cope any longer with the patient” (DHSS, 
1978. p. 32). The comment is significant in the context of our discussion of 
carers since it recognises that the involvement of relatives is not simply on the 
basis of their knowledge of and capacity to take decisions on behalf of their 
relatives but also on the basis of their own troubles or suffering. This as we 
shall see is nearer the understanding of the situation that is embodied in the 
term “carer.” 
The rise of the term “carer” 
The word ”carer” emerged in the 1970s in the context of an academic 
literature discussing community care. Popularised by pressure group politics 
and debates within academic feminism, it spread to professional and policy- 
making circles in the 1980s (Pahl, 1992; Twigg and Atkin, 1994). Though still 
a professionally-oriented term, it has achieved some currency in ordinary 
language and is now widely used by politicians and journalists. Care-giving 
relations had, of course, existed long before the development of the term. Its 
emergence, however, marked a new consciousness of the public policy issues 
raised by caring to which a number of factors contributed: demographic 
concern over the rising proportion of older people in the population; the 
active promotion of community care by Conservative governments who saw 
it as not only the preferred but also the cheaper option; countervailing 
anxieties among feminists and others as to the likely consequences of such 
policies on the lives of women, regarded (particularly in the early 1980s) as 
the main providers of informal care; and increased public awareness from 
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research and from pressure groups like the Carers National Association of 
the burdens borne by many carers (Twigg and Atkin, 1994). 
In the 1970s concern over the issue resulted in the development of a 
benefit for carers: Invalid Care Allowance. Provided for those who were out 
of work by virtue of caring, but initially excluding married women, its 
coverage has been limited by virtue of its interaction with other benefits and 
its exclusion of those over pensionable age (DHSS, 1974; McLaughlin, 
1991). The Social Security Benefits Act 1975, cl. 37, does not use the word 
“carer”, but refers to those who are “regularly and substantially engaged in 
caring” for “a severely disabled person” defined as someone in receipt of 
Attendance Allowance. 
As we have seen, the NHS and Community Care Act 1990 and associated 
guidance left the word “carer” undefined. There was no attempt made to 
determine a hierarchy of responsibility as had existed in the liable relatives 
tradition or in mental health legislation, though as Qureshi and Walker have 
demonstrated, caring responsibilities do devolve on individuals in ways that 
reflect very similar hierarchies. The early literature on carers, starting as it 
did from concern over the support of older people and the differential 
burdens borne by daughters and daughters-in-law, tended to conceptualise 
caring in intergenerational terms. This does indeed represent the largest 
proportion of those offering care, but other relationships are also significant, 
notably those of spouses and of parents caring for children. Spouses are 
particularly significant in the support of middle-aged and younger elderly 
people, and their activities-particularly those of wives-are often obscured 
behind the mutual reciprocities of marriage (Parker, 1992b). Recognising 
that spouses could also be carers marked an important shift in the politics of 
the subject. Conceptualising parents as carers has, as we shall see, proved 
more controversial and the application of the term has in some degree been 
resisted by both parents and professionals. We shall return to this below. 
So far we have seen caring in terms of kinship relations, but can friends 
and neighbours be carers? Certainly within the meaning of the Act they can 
since the term is not explicitly tied to family relations. In practice, however, 
they rarely take on this role. Friends and neighboursgive valuable support to 
frail and disabled people, but what they do tends to be circumscribed, and 
they are not by and large involved in intensive or intimate care (Green, 1988; 
Sinclair, et al., 1990; Atkin, 1992). Above all the basis for their involvement 
is different, not rooted in kinship obligation but in more voluntaristic forms 
of association. The significance of this difference for public policy will be 
explored further below. Before doing so, however, we need to look at the 
elements that make up our understanding of being a “carer.” I will outline 
these briefly and then suggest the particular significance of two of them in the 
emergence of the new terminology. 
First, caring is most frequently understood as involving physical tasks of a 
supportive kind such as lifting, bathing, or feeding. It is not always easy to 
distinguish such caring tasks from the more general servicing work under- 
taken by women in families; and to this degree the care-giving work of men is 
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often more easily defined and visible than that of women. The emphasis on 
the performance of tasks has been important in the conceptualisation of 
caring as work, often hard physical work. Second, caring is embedded in 
kinship. Nearly all caring takes place in the  context of the family, governed 
by the norms of kinship obligation. Qureshi and Walker have suggested a 
hierarchy of caring responsibilities that descends through family relations, 
starting with spouses, followed by daughters, daughters-in-law and sons, 
though modified by factors such as geography or employment. Finch and 
Mason (1993) suggest that while such perceptionsof hierarchy exist, they are 
subject to complex micro-negotiation. In both accounts, however, the 
concept of kinship obligation remains central. Third. caring is about emo- 
t ion.  Caring relationships are typically characterised by feelings of love, 
though not always in the straightforward way that the normative picture 
might suggest. Emotion is not  only central to the experience of and motiva- 
tion for care but also to the task; and caring can be conceptualised as a form 
of emotional labour. 
The fourth element concerns the sense common to all carers that they are 
in some way responsib/e for the person they look after. Sometimes the 
responsibility turns around facilitating other forms of support; sometimes it 
means keeping an eye out for the person, stepping in when things go wrong 
or when help is needed. Lastly caring has to be recognised as something that 
has corzseqitences for the carer’s life. This is particularly so where the carer 
and the cared-for person share a household and where the impact of caring 
comes as much from the consequences of sharing your life with someone 
whose own life is limited or whose behaviour causes stress as from the tasks 
of caring itself. 
The significance of the term “carer” 
These last two elements-responsibility and consequences-are, I would 
argue, central to our understanding of the significance of the term “carer” 
and its recent emergence. “Carer” is never simply a word describing kinship 
relations. I t  has always carried a public policy component. I t  emerged within 
a discourse about community care and the responsibilities of the individual 
and the state. What was new and distinctive about the term was not so much 
that i t  delineated more clearly a particular family relationship previously 
obscured or overlooked, but that it implied a new moral claim within public 
discourse. This moral claim rests on a recognition that these are relations of 
obligation that can have severe consequences for carers and in which they are 
not free to abandon caring once the burdens have become onerous or the 
tasks distressing. Unlike friends and neighbours who are more peripherally 
involved and whose obligations are limited, they cannot withdraw at will. 
Carers are thus not free to act fully in their own interests and often continue 
to care against their own interests, as the extensive literature on the burdens 
borne by certain carers in the context of limited or no rewards makes plain 
(Wright, 1986; Lewis and Meredith, 1988; Ungerson, 1987; Levin, et a f . ,  
1989; Parker, 1990; Twigg, 1992). It is this fact that enables carers to lay claim 
to public consideration in their own right. Regarding someone as a carer 
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rather than just a relative bestows on them a different status within public 
discourse. They have needs and interests that have to be recognised per se. 
The extent to which these interests are in fact recognised is of course 
another matter. Welfare agencies have largely been content to ignore such 
claims, relying on the activities of carers but doing little to support or 
alleviate them. In so far as they have recognised the needs of carers, it has 
been on an instrumental basis, seeing support for carers as the most 
effective-often cost-effective-means of supporting older and disabled 
people. 
I have explored elsewhere the tensions that arise for agencies in concep- 
tualising their relationship with carers, distinguishing between a concept of 
the carer as a resource, as co-worker and as co-client (Twigg, 1989). These 
correspond in large measure to the difference between assuming the input of 
carers and excluding any consideration of their needs; adopting an instru- 
mental approach to their support as a means of achieving other welfare ends; 
and a recognition of their needs and interests per se. 
So long as the predominant conception remained that of regarding carers 
simply as a resource available in the community, the term carer was not 
needed; relative or family would suffice. Once public policy, however, had 
begun to encompass the second two elements, a new term was needed, and it 
was for that reason that the word “carer” emerged in public discourse in the 
1 980s. 
The challenge to the concept of carer: the disability critique 
The conception of carers as people with an interest that requires public 
recognition has recently been subject to challenge. The disability movement 
has criticised what it sees as an improper emphasis on the needs of carers at 
the expense of those for whom they care (Oliver, 1990; Morris, 1991). In this 
view, rather than supporting carers in their activities, public policy should 
aim to enable disabled people to live independently and thus to transcend 
the need for caring relations. Focusing on the carer’s needs and interests 
diverts attention from the real task in hand, and reinforces relations of 
subordination and dependence. Disabled people should be able to have and 
make relationships but these should not be made a basis for caring. The 
language of “carers” and “caring” should therefore be resisted and words 
such as “helper” substituted, words that separate practical assistance from 
any moral roots and place the disabled person clearly in control. 
The social base of the disability movement is among younger people with 
physical disabilities and its theories reflect their experiences and aspirations. 
While I accept these ideas, certain provisos need to be made to their 
application. First, not all disabled people want to be free of reliance on their 
families. Some want and indeed demand that they be cared for. Spouses in 
particular often regard care as part of the mutual interdependence of 
marriage, and resist attempts to substitute for it. In these cases caring 
continues to have consequences for the carer and that fact deserves to be 
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acknowledged. Second, there are situations where only the support of close 
relatives will enable a person to remain at home. This applies in particular to 
dementia where transcending the need for a carer is an unrealistic aspiration 
and one contrary to the interests of the disabled person. 
The fact of kinship obligation and the strong affective bonds that it draws 
on means both that carers will continue to feel responsible for their relatives 
and that caring will have consequences for their lives. So long as this is the 
case. there is a need to incorporate their interest into public policy. The use 
of the word “carer” allows us to do so. This is not to argue that all care-giving 
relations are benign or that carers’ interests should prevail over those of the 
cared-for person. What is required is a duality of focus: a recognition that 
care-giving takes place in a relationship in which both parties have legitimate 
interests which need to be balanced. 
The challenge to the concept of carer: other client groups 
The discourse on carers and caring emerged as part of the concern with the 
support of older people but its terminology has spread to other client groups. 
In two areas, however, it has met with some resistance: learning disabilities 
and mental health problems. 
Parents of adults with learning disabilities are often reluctant to term 
themselves carers, preferring the word “parent” as better representing how 
they see the relationship. This is not dissimilar from the feelings of spouses 
and children looking after elderly parents who will also often deny that they 
are carers, preferring to see their activities in  the context of the personal 
relationship. As we have noted, the word “carer” has retained some of the 
flavour of its original professional context. Where individuals do  adopt it of 
themselves, it often marks a shift towards a more assertive attitude to the 
negotiation of public recognition and support (Twigg and Atkin, 1994). 
Sometimes service providers are instrumental in helping people make this 
shift into a self-perception as a carer. In the case of parents of adults with 
learning disabilities, service providers, particularly those of a progressivist 
stance, can be reluctant to be involved in this way. Encouraging parents to 
see themselves as carers implies their continuing responsibility for the 
person with learning disabilities. Theories of normalisation and indepen- 
dent living aim to allow the person with learning disability to leave home in 
the same way that non-disabled children do: to grow out of and beyond 
parental care and responsibility. To term parents “carers” denies that 
possibility. In progressive circles parents are increasingly perceived as at best 
overprotective and at worst substituting their interests for those of the 
person with learning disabilities (Hubert, 1990; Ward, 1990; McGrath, 
1991). Implicitly recognising their interest through the use of the term 
“carer” has therefore been resisted, and the words “parent” or “relative” 
remain the predominant and preferred ones. 
Similar tensions arise in  relation to people with mental health problems, 
where the  use of the word “carer” has made even less headway. This is partly 
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because the field is medically dominated and doctors are less likely to 
conceptualise family relationships in terms of carers than are those with a 
social care perspective. The traditional focus of medicine is on the individual 
patient, even the individual condition; and doctors in so far as they consider 
the social context of the patient-and in most hospital consultations relatives 
and carers remain literally invisible-tend to conceptualise it in terms of 
“families” or “relatives,” part of the background to the case but not part of 
the concern of the doctor. As a result the literature on families of people with 
mental health problems has developed in isolation from the main carer 
literature and is conceived in narrower terms (Perring et af., 1990). Families 
are primarily seen as a source of information about the patient; and their 
stresses and difficulties, where recognised, are largely so on an instrumental 
basis, something that may result in the collapse of care rather than something 
of concern per se (Twigg and Atkin, 1994). 
Resistance to the term “carer” arises also for reasons that parallel those 
found in learning disabilities. The situations of people who develop schizo- 
phrenia in early adulthood are in many ways similar to those with learning 
disabilities, and professionals in this field have the same aspirations for their 
clients and patients to live independent lives. Parents are often perceived as 
overprotective and professionals are reluctant to encourage this through a 
perception of them as carers. In relation to problems such as depression, the 
status of relatives is more equivocal. The role of psychosocial factors in 
depression has long been recognised, indeed many would argue that such 
problems are best understood as arising from social circumstances with 
which the individual is unable to cope rather than from mental illness as 
such. Among these circumstances can be the family and marital relations of 
the sufferer. Relatives may thus be part of the problem--causers as well as 
carers-and professionals consequently reluctant to endorse their activities 
by recognising them as carers. 
The four legal traditions revisited 
The Poor Law defined the limits of legal obligation among family members 
in the context of the costs to the state of the upkeep of the destitute poor. As 
we have seen, it was part of a continuing debate around the question of who 
bears the responsibility for the support of older people in society, in which 
the emphasis has oscillated between the two poles of the state and the family. 
The current debate on carers is part of that tradition, though focused in a 
rather different way as the new terminology of carers makes plain. Unlike 
the old poor law debates, the issue is not primarily about financial support. 
The idea that people should have the basic financial means to live indepen- 
dently in old age is generally accepted. The debate around carers is about 
care rather than financial support, and turns around the provision of physical 
and emotional help to people who are disabled or frail. It is at that point that 
the terminology of the carer is triggered. 
Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 
In a second sense, too, the debate on carers is focused in a different way, in 
that the references to carers in the new legislation and guidance are not about 
enforcing obligation-overtly at least-but about acknowledging activities 
and burdens. It is about recognising care-giving rather than family respon- 
sibilities though the two are of course linked. I t  thus follows a social reality 
rather than attempting to impose one, recognising responsibilities that have 
been accepted and acted upon rather than making assumptions of respon- 
sibility based solely on the ascriptive criteria of family relationship. 
Having said this, it may still be the case that the emergence of the term 
“carer” does have an enforcing quality to it, not so much in relation to  the 
individual, as more generally within the policy debate. That which is named 
and defined in the discourse becomes actual-available, at least at the level 
of theory. It can be no coincidence that the term “carer” emerged just at the 
point when appreciation of the growing proportion of older people in the 
population resulted in heightened anxiety as to the costs of their care. Across 
Europe we can observe caring emerging as an issue in parallel with rising 
demographic and fiscal concern over old age. The language of caring and 
carers allows for the co-option of a new element in the care equation, for the 
slotting-in of a fourth sector-informal-to join those of public, voluntary 
and private in the new mixed economy of care. 
In relation to inheritance, the rise of the term “carer” has had no direct 
impact in  law. As we saw, however, changes in perception in the 1980s meant 
that caring and inheritance were increasingly linked in the policy debate. 
How far are such links made by the families themselves? Has the concept of 
the care bargain revived in the wake of growing public familiarity with the 
issue of caring? Despite the enthusiasm of policy-makers, there is no 
empirical evidence to support the view that families are operating on such a 
basis. Finch and her colleagues in their study of inheritance and family 
obligation found n o  evidence of families entering into either explicit or 
implicit bargains whereby inheritance was adjusted to reflect care-giving 
(Finch and Wallis, 1992). Other principles such as the obligation to treat 
offspring equally were more determining. Finch and her colleagues remain 
sceptical of the existence of care bargains. Testamentary acts reflect the 
summation of a lifetime’s relationships rather than the contingencies of 
current circumstances, and their roots lie in  general moral obligations 
concerning kinship rather than in instrumental rewards for care-giving. 
As we have seen, the legal role of relatives in decision-making is currently 
narrowly circumscribed. The shift towards care, however, has created a 
growing appreciation of their importance in the support of frail and disabled 
people-an importance reflected in  the Law Commission Report. One focus 
of its concern has been with medical decision-making and the need to find a 
legal mechanism to enable surrogate decisions. Here relatives are incorpor- 
ated in the proposals less as “carers” than as family members-individuals 
who are close to the patient and can be assumed to reflect the patient’s likely 
views and interests. There is some recognition of the conceptual shift 
involved in  the term “carer” in relation to other forms of decision-making, 
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particularly those relating to daily living, with the recognition that individ- 
uals may need to be empowered to act as carers-to take decisions and have 
access to resources. The special position of the carer is acknowledged, but in 
a way that retains an instrumental focus: enabling the carer better to assist 
the disabled person. But adopting a carer focus also involves recognising that 
carers have needs per se. The nature of the relationship means that their 
interests are affected in parallel with those of the person they care for, and 
this could be said to endow them with a legitimate interest in relation to 
certain decisions. This aspect has not as yet been reflected in the current legal 
debate. 
Mental health legislation is the one field where relatives’ right to be 
involved in decision-making has been encoded. This is largely on the basis of 
their knowledge of the case, recognising that they are in a unique position to 
interpret the patient’s current state and to be alert to deterioration. The 
current legislativz position does contain a muted recognition that relatives 
can also be carers in the sense that they may take responsibility for the 
person with mental health problems and may suffer as a result of the care 
they give. But as we have seen, professionals are uneasy with such charac- 
terisations and unlikely to want to see any extension of the perception of 
relatives as carers. 
Conclusion 
The 1990 Act has brought carers out of the shadows of policy debate into the 
limelight of public statute. For the first time the interests of carers have been 
publicly recognised in law. It is as yet a limited recognition, confined to 
consultation, but one that through the associated guidance is achieving a 
wider remit. Though the law has touched on issues of family relations and 
responsibilities before, and thus tangentially on caring, it has done so within 
different conceptual frameworks, ones that have not focused on the particu- 
lar nature of care-giving and the obligations and consequences associated 
with it. The emergence of the word “carer” and its use in statute mark a new 
departure for public policy, one in which caring is acknowledged as a public 
policy issue and in which the needs and interests of carers are recognised, 
albeit still within a predominantly instrumental framework. 
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